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ABSTRACT 
127 
The main purpose of this paper is to study the impact of consumer concentration 
around the market center on the equilibrium locations of location-price games. In the case 
of symmetric triangular density， i(is shown that no symmetric equllibrium exists. 
How:ever， we demonstrate the existence of asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies; these 
equilibria are also characterized. Our secondary purpose is to study the sequentia1 entry of 
two firms when the location space is not restricted to the market space. 'rhis leads us to 
uncover a substantia1 first-mover advantage， which has been neglecもedin the literature. 
* This research was initiated whi1e the first author was visiting CORE. The second 
author thanks the Ka主maFoundation that supported his visit to Kyoto University. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the pioneering contribution of Hotelli時 (1929)，rnost of the literature on 
spatial competition has assumed a uniform distribution of consumers(s田 Gabszewiczand 
Thisse (1992) for a recent survey and references). Clearly， such a simplifying assumption is 
due to its mathematical tractability. However， research in marketing has pointed out the 
位 istenceof "consumer pockets" in the characteristics space， corresponding to customers 
whose preferences are clustered around some fashionable brands (see， e.g. Kuehn and Day 
(1962)). Similarly， inthe urban setting， itis well known that the distribution of 
households is concentrated around the central business district (see， e.g. Clark (1951)). 
Therefore， the need to consider non-uniform distributions is apparent. 
In this paper， we study the equilibrium locations of location-price games when 
consumers are concentrated around the market center. For this purpose， we consider the 
simple case of a symme紅icand triangular density of consumers. The higher concentration 
of consumers around the center suggests that firms would move toward more central 
locations than in the case of a uniform density. This a priori reasonable conjecture is not 
confirmed by the analysis. Somewhat surprisingly， there exists no symmetric location 
equi1brium in this model. • This is because the best reply functions are discontinuous when 
firms are symmetrically located. However， asymmetric equilibria turn out to exist. Thus， 
in equilibrium， one firm is strictly better-of than its rival despite the fact that the firms 
compete under identical conditions. As discussed in the concluding senction， this is not an 
artifact of triangular density. The same results hold for a wide cIass of convex densities 
such as the negative exponentials， thus casting some doubts on the robustness of results 
derived under the uniform density assumtion. Furthermore， we relax the standard 
assumption that firms must locate inside the market space. To our surprise， other 
equilibria emerge when firms are free to choose their locations outside the market space. 
The secondary purpose of this paper is to revisit Hotelling's duopoly model in light 
of Prescott and Vissche内 (1977)approach. These authors observe that many real world 
location decisions are not made simultaneously， but rather sequentially. Given that most 
location decisions are irrevocable， the first entran 
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the subsequent entrants. In this paper， we limit ourse1ves to the case of two firms. Both 
firms enter the market sequentially but choose their prices simultaneously. Our 
formulation of sequential entry differs， therefore， from that adopted by Anderson (1987) 
who considers a twか-stageStackelberg game in location and price. Since， inmost cases， 
prices can be revised after the entry of a new firm， asimultaneous Nash equilibrium seems 
indeed to be more appropriate to model price competition. Moreover， here also， we do not 
assume that the location space is restricted to the mark叫 space. This 1eads to a 
substantial fi叫 -moveradvantage， unlike Neven (1987) who assumes that firms locate 
inside the markeもspace.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is described in 
Section 2. In Section 3， we explore the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibria in 
pure strategi四 fora location-price game in which the consumer density is triangular. In 
Section 4， the assumption of simultaneous location choices is replaced with that of 
sequential choices and the corresponding equilibrium is analyzed. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
2. THE MODEL 
There are t¥vo firms producing a homogeneous good at a constant and equal 
marginal cost， which is set equal to zero. There is a continuum of consumers distributed 
over the unit segment [0，1] and .their location is denoted by XE[O，1]. Let F(x) be the 
cumulative distribution of consur:悶"8， where the total population F(1) is I悶 malizedto one， 
and f(x) be the corresponding density. Two distributions are considered in this paper: (i) 
the unφ1m density in which f(x)=1 for al XE[O，1]i (i) the trian，仰lardensity in which 
f(x)=2-212x-11 for al XE[O，1]. We retain these two distributions because the uniform 
density is commonplace in the literature and because the triangular one is the simplest 
density that captures the idea of consumer concentration about one point. The 
transportation cost incurred by consumers is assumed to be a quadratic function of distance 
(without 108 of generality， the tran8portation coefficient i8 normalized to one). Each 
con8umer buys one unit of the good from the firm having the lower ful price (i.e.， mill 
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p山eplus transportation cost). 
When firms are set up at x1 fX2 in IR， the marginal consumer， who is indifferent 
between purchasing from either firm， is located at x as given by: 
i三(PP1+《-xi)/2(xfX1)(1)
When x1 <x2' the firms' profit functions are respectively 
日1= P1 F(x) and 12 = P2[1-F(x)]. (2) 
For x1>x2 they are 
日1= P1[1-F(x)] and 12 = P2F(x). (3) 
Finally， when x1=x2' the profit functions are as in the Bertrand game. 
We seek subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Hence， we solve the game by backward 
induction， starting from the last stage: given x1 and x2' firms choose simultaneously their 
(mill) price P1 and P2 with Pl'P2~0. The following result， due to Caplin and Nalebuff 
(1991)， guarantees the e対stenceof a price equilibrium in pure strategies for a wide class of 
consumer density functions that includes the uniform and triangular ones. 
Proposition 1 
If the transportation cost is quadratic in distance，的enfor any given locations of 
firms and for any l09 ・-concaveconsumer density function，l伽 reexists a Nash price 
equilibrium. Furthermore， this equilibrium is unique. 
Assuming x1くx2'the profit functions are differentiable， and the first-order 
conditions for equilibrium prices are given by 
。TI1 Pl f(x) ーニ=F(x)一J.一一=0， 
OP1 .. 2(x
2
-x
1
) 
(4a) 
。I1') p')f(x) 
一二=l-F(x)一一乙一一=o. 
OP2 .. 2(x
2
-x
1
) 
(4b) 
We know from Proposition 1 that (4a) and (4b) yield a unique price equilibrium when f(x) 
is log-concave. Expressions similar to (4a) and (4b) can be obtained for x1>x2・
Regarding the earlier stage(s) of the game， we assume in section 3 that firms ch∞se 
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simultaneously their locations x1 and x2 in IR， while in section 4 we suppose that firms 
select their locations sequentiaUy. ln both c制es，they anticipate the outcome of the 
subsequent price stage given by Proposition 1. 
3. SIMULTANEOUS LOCATION CHOICE 
We assume here that both firms select their location simultaneously and then， after 
having observed the decisions made， choose their price simulaneously. When x1=x2'山e
* * profit functions are I1 (xl'x2)=II2(xl'x2)=0. Suppose now that x1 <x2 (without loss of 
generality， this assumption is made throughout this section and the next one). Plugging 
the自附-ordercondi tions (4a)イ4b)for equilibrium p山esinto (2) yields 山epayotf 
functions of the location game: 
日:(X内)= 2(x2-x1)出 )/f(み(ぬ)* ， ." r. T"91 ^  ¥ 12I2(xl'x2) = 2(x2-x1)[1-F(x)J'" /f(x). (5b) 
N I N N，.寧
A Nash location equilibrium，茎 =(xi，x2) is such that firm i maxi凶畑 IIi(xi，xj')with 
児spectto xi (i，j=l，2 and i/j). Clearly， the agglomeration of the two firms (x1=~) is 
never an equi1brium of the location game since the profits are zero. Furthermore， forany 
given location pair， xcan be determined by solving the equation 
2F(x) -1 + (x-x1/2-x2/2)f(x) = 0， (6) 
which is obtained directly by subtracting (4b) from (4a) and by replacing P2-P1 in (1). At 
any location equilib山 m，XE]O，l[ since otherwise one firm would be driven out of business. 
Furthermore， x=1/2 if and only if firms have symmetric locations. 
ln the uniform density case， (6)shows that 
x = (2+x1 +x2)/6. 
With the triangular density， two cas倒 arise.If x1 +x2く1，then 
(7) 
?????????? ?? (8a) 
8 
ifx.+x，>l. then l' ~2 
xzX1 +x2+6-.J{x1十x2-2)2+8 
8 
(8b) 
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It is e踊Yto check that (8a) and (8b) are equal to 1/2 when the two firms are located 
symmetrically (x1 +x2=1). When x isdifferentiable， 5:ox/ ox1 =ox/δX2>O. 
If f(x) is differentiable， we have 
8IL ~2 ， ^  
-:r，;-=ー よ年L十2(x円 )F(i)6ー (x，>-x1)~(x~f:~x)Q=o UAif(x)A AaA f&(x) (9a) 
dI1n f. ~I \ 唱 2r1-F(xW 01.. •• ¥r1 "(;'f:¥H f.. •• \r1-F(x)1~f'(x)Q= 0 涜-=己主立ι-2(x2-x1)[1-F(x)]6 ー (x2-x1)1"-.1"\:~四 一f(x) . ~ "0' . M"O f.<o(x) (9b) 
Dividing (9a) by F(x) and (9b) by 1-F(x)， adding these two位 pressioDS，and substituting 
(x2-x1)6from (9b)， we obtain after dmplifications 
H(x) 三 [1-2F(~)]r2(~)ー [1-F(x)]F(x)f'(x) = O. (10) 
This equation must be satisfied for any location equilibrium such that f'(x) exists. 
3.1 Consider first the case of a uniform density. Clearly， x=1/2 is the only solution to 
(10) so that the equilibrium locations must be symmetric. Using (7)， (5a) and (5b) can be 
rewritten as 
* I11(x1，x2) = (x2-x1)(2十x1十~)2/18，
* H2(xl，X2)=(X2-X1)(4-xl-X2)2/18. 
(l1a) 
(l1b) 
Because the strategy space of firm 1 isunbounded and because its payoff is continuously 
differentiable everywhere， firm 1's equi1brium location must satisfy the first-order 
condition as an equality. Differentiating (lla) with respect to x1 yields after 
simplifications -2-3x1 +x2=O. Since we may restrict ourselves to a symmetric solution 
(x1 +x2=1)， the candidate equi1brium locations are given by 
司=ー 1/4 and x~ = 5/4. (12) 
*本
The second-order conditions of m叩 mizationof I11 and I12 being satisfied at these values， 
(12) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the location game. Hence， under a U1ゆm
distributionJ firms choose to locate outside the market. This unexpected resu1t reflects the 
fact that price competition under quadratic transportation costs is very fierce indeed. 
However， firms do not want to set up at infinity because the two best reply curves are 
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linear and not parallel. 
3.2 We now move to the triangular density. Our first resuIt rules out the possibility of 
symmetric equilibria. 
Proposition 2 
For the symmetric triang包lardistribution 01 consumers， there exits no symmetric 
location equilib付包m.
牢
Proof' Since the distribution is tria時ular，we can compute I1 defined by (5a) when 
X1 and x2 are almost symmetric. about the market center. After some standard， but 
tedious， calculations， we obtain 
傘*
I1 (1-x2一収2)-H1(1-X2，X2)=(1-X2)E/2+O(F)，
組 d
* * I1(1-x2+ε''2) -I1(1-x2バ2)= 5(x2-4/5)e/12 + O( f2)， 
where E>O is small enough. That is: (a) for ザ /5，we have II;(1-X2一句)>
申 申
I1 (1-x2匂)j (b) for 4/5くx2<1， IIl(1-x2-f，x2)>IIl(1-x2，x2) and * * 本*
I1(1-x2+fバ2)>I1 (1-x2，x2)j (c) for x2~l ， I1 (1-x2+収 2)>I1 (1-~ ，x2) ・ Therefore ，
when x1 and x2 are symmetric about the center， x1 is not firm 1's b田treply against x2・
The same holds for firm 2. 
• 
The nonexistence of a symmetric equilibrium is somewh叫 surprisingsince our game 
involves two identical firms competing under identical conditions. It is due to the 
discontinuity of the best reply function when x1十x2=1(see Figure 1 for an ilu附 a叫ti拘on吋)
This discontinuity itself a町ri泊se四sbecause of the discontinuity 0ぱfI' a叫tthe market c閃en叫te釘r.
When firms are symmetrically located but far enough， the discontinu~ty of C'(x) at x=1/2 
makes an infinitesimal move inward profitable because the firm gains a whole strip of 
consumers. On the other hand， when firms are symmetrically located b凶 notfar from each 
other， the discontinuity makes an infinitesimal move outward profitable because prices 
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steeply increase (as shown by differentiating (4a) with respect to X1). In a more formal 
*キ
way， we observe that the profit function IT~ (IT;) is not quasi-concave: when 4/5くX2く1
(see case (b) in the above proof) ， the symmetric configuration corresponds to a local 
本本
凶凶mumof IT1 (IT2). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
However， asymmetric equilibria may exist as shown below. 
Proposition 9 
When the distribution 01 cons旬mersis triangular， there exist two asymmetric Nash 
location equilibria， which are given by 
N N. ( (-.s/9，5J6/ 18) 
(X7，X2)={ 
J.-~. l (1-5J6/18 ， 1+伊/9).
Proof" By Proposition 2， we may restrict ourselves to asymmetric location pairs. Since 
x#1/2， f'(x) exists. Solving (10)， we get the following values for x: 0，1/孔1-1/J6，1.We 
have already seen that x=O and x=1 must be ruled out. Hence， only two solutions are left: 
x=1/拘 andx==1-1/J6. The corresponding candidate equilibrium locations can be 
obtained from (6) and (9a): (ー伊/9，5J6/18)and (1-5亦/18，1+J6/9).We show below that 
the first location pair is an equilibrium. Since the setting is symmetric about 1/2， this 
implies that the second pair is also an equilibrium. 
N (i) Let us show that x!i=，用/9is もhebest reply against x2=5J6/18. 
Repla叫 X2byX1州伽ldd雌 :re釘削I
牟
aIT 万王-=πLで[ー16~2+(10/ん+1]，1 4 1 8x~ + 1 
4ド
when XE]0，1/2[. The sign of aIT1/ &1 is given by山esign of G1 (x)三一16~2+(10/J6)~十1.
Cle吋， G1(むきofor ;~1/孔 which cor岬 0附 tox~~-.，J6/9. Th恥e吋凧 inor吋蜘d
pro刊削キー伊/9yields a global maximun * 
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* XE]l/2，1[ because IT1 is continuous with respect to x. 
When XE]l/2，1[， some tedious calculations show that 
初1一川l-x)2 ‘4 36-10J6 (1 _~，3 "'1 :"，2 18-5J百刃丁一 四 四 ~[32(I-x)':t- ~弓立と (l-x)"-2(1-x)"'-~巴(l-x)ー 1].
oX1 (l-x)[8(I-x)斗1]'--'--， 3 ，--， -，--， u 
*‘ 
135 
The sign of oIT1/OX1 is given by the sign of G2(x) defined by the bracketed term at the 
numerator of this ex:pression. It is readily verified that G2(1/2) and G2(1) are both 
negative. Furthermore， studying the first and the second order derivatives of G2(x) shows 
that this function first decreases and then increases over the i泊nt旬erva叫1]ド1/β2，1叫[. Hen偲'
G2(ωiむ)く<Oft伽O町ra1l山i司仰1/β丸勾叫，1可[川
N 
(i) We nex:t prove that xi=明/18is firm仇 best哨捌nstx~=--ß/9. The N 
argument is similar to the one above. First， forXE]O，I/2[， we have 
oITn • I r;; 2 xーl/J6r "..3，...'.n A2， An"，.A2'.，nn"'2 一一=→ず←[-u4x"(17/48-x")→o何x"(7/20-x")/3一地/3-./fJ].
oX2 8x
u+x 
Since the b叫州 termis negative，it is dear that aI;jha伽 ig帆 which
N ∞rresponds to x2~5Jff/18. Therefore， in0蜘 toprove that x2' =刷18yields a global 
* ma羽mum，it suffices to show that oIT2/ôx2~O for al XE]I/2，1[. 
When XE]I/2，1[， we have 
* θITn n/. A， 3 
2 2(1-x) " 一一一-~\ J.:~6 [(2x-l)(9-8x) + 4(I-x)/何]，
oX2 8(ト.x)'"+1 
which is negative for al XE]I/2，I[. 
• 
The market share of firm 1 isF(I/凋)=1/3at the fi附 locationequilibrium， and 
F(I-1/持)=2/3at the second one. The corresponding profits are (7/54，14/27) and 
(14/27，7/54) respectively. These profit values are les than the pro宣tearned by each firm 
in the uniform case. The concentration of consumers around the center attracts the two 
firms， which reduces the distance between them and intensifies price competition. The 
result is a decrease in the equiIibrium profits of both firms.2 
Unlike the uniform distribution， the triangular distribution， though symmetric， 
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leads to asymmetric locations， prices and profits. In other words， competition between two 
identical firms results in asymmet付clocations if consumers are symmetrically concentrated 
around the center. This shows the lack of robustness of the symmetric equilibrium which 
often appears in the literature on spatial competition. However， the existence of two 
asymmetric equilibria， inwhich firms ma批edifferent profits， leaves open the qu剖tionof 
which equilibrium arises. 
4. SEQUENTIAL LOCATION CHOICE 
Until now， we have focused on the simultaneous game in location. However，舗
discussed in出eintroduction， itmay be mοre realistic to assume that firms enter the 
markeもsequentiaUywhile price competition remains simultaneous. More precisely，ぬere
are now three stages. The first two stages describe a Stackelberg game in location while 
the third stage is a simultaneous subgame in price. 
Formally， the model of Section 2 has to be modified in the following manner. Firm 
本
1 (the lead町)maximizes its profit r1 (xl'x2) with問sp倒 tox1' replacing x2 by firm 2 (the 
follower )'s best 問plyfunction x2=R(x1)， which is itself derived from the maximization of 
牢
r2(x1バ2)with 四spectω~・ The 日sulting Stackelberg location equilibrium is denoted by 
S I S S 主=(xi勾). Assuming that R(x1) issingle-valued and differentiable， the first-order 
conditions for such an equilibrium are as follows: 
キ* * dr， or， or， dR 1 VLL1."''1 ー=一一+一一一 (13a)
dx， ox， OXn dx 1 ...1 .，..2...1
本
or 2 一一=0， (13b) 
oX2 
where品 /dx1is叩 altoィa2r;/ox汐1)/(何/吋)制叫伊)and (9b) with resp似
to x1 and x2' and replacing these variables in (13a)， we get: 
*ぬ
dn1 4F(x)K(xjx1) 
dx~ -{2f2(ミ)+11-F(i)!?(i)}ふ
where 
2， . 
K(xjx1)三[1-2F(x)+R'(x1)W'(x)一[1-F(x)]F(x)f'(x). (14) 
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Using (l1b)， the denominator of (14) can be shown to be positive for al XE]O，1[ so that 
* sgn(dIT1/dx1)= sgn(K(x)). This property is used in the proposition below. 
Proposition -1 
庁thedistribution of co悶umersis unψrm or triang包lar，then the first entrant 
necessarily locates at the market center. 
Proof: 
(i) Uniform distribution 
Some standard manipulations show that firm 2's best reply function is 
R(x1)=x1/3+4/3. Using this expression and (7)， (14) shows that 
牟
sgn( dII1/dx1)=sgn(I-2x1). Therefore， the optimum location of the first entrant is 
xi=1/2 
(i) Triangular distribution 
Because f(x) is symmetric， 比 i旭ss印ufi占町伽f
X1E]-吋 /2(suchthat XE]O，I[. 
(a) Assume first that x51/2. 
By solving (6) and (9b) with respect to x1 and x2' itcan be shown that (5a) 
depends only upon X三~2E[Ò ， I/4]:
3 . n..2 日(X)=~(42X 328X4X-11 
12X"-4X-l 
Di日erentiatingthis expr部sionwith respect to X， we get 
dH:(X)/dXz5(X) 
ゐ (12X副-4X-l)
where L(X) 三一768X5+ 720X4 -96X3 -56X2 +8X + 1. Differentiati略 L(X) yields 
1'(X)=8(1-2X)M(X)， where M(X)=1-12X-60X2+240X3. Difi町田tiatingM(X) gives 
2 M'(X)=12(ー1-10X+60X"'). Sin回 M'(O)くoand M'(1/4)>O， M'(X) ch加g回 itssign only 
once in the interval [0，1/4]. Moreover， since M(O)>O and M(1/4)<0， M(X)，組dhen回
* L'(X)， changes its sign only once in [0，1/4]. Consequently， dIT1(X)/dX is first increasing 
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キキ
and then decreasing on [0，1/4] because sgn(dIl1(X)/dX)=sg叫L(X))・ SincedIl1/dX>0 at 
X=O and X=1/4， and since 叙/&1>0， we can concIude t山ha叫t 
本牢
s昭叩gr伊n叫耐刷l(刷制(付伊d訂叩Il吋
(伊例b吋 Supposenow that x沿>1/β2.
Computing K( XjX1)舗 givenby (14)， we get 
sgn(叩 :lh)=sgn(6(1ふ)2-Mr(X1))，M41/211(15)
It therefore remains to show that (15) is positive. 
Seもting(9b) equa1 to zero and using (8b)， we get firm 2's besもreplyfunction R(x1). 
Differentiating R(x1) with respect to x1' we obtain 
1 . 9(I-x1) . 24[1+3(I-x1)/C] 
R'(x1) =ー+ーーム+ 一
.1' 4 4C (3-3x1+C) 
1 9(I-x1) 24 〉ー +ー ムー+一一一一三 N(x1)， 
4 20 5(8-3x1) ~ 
where C言ゐ(1-xl)2+16く 5伽必1x1 E]O，I/2]・Inded，mmi〉1/2，X2=R(X1)liesabove 
x1 +x2=1 which implies that x1 must be positive as shown by Figure 1. 
2 However， sin印 N'(x1)= 9(-9や倣C32)/[20(3xl-8)"']<0on [0，1/2]， we have 
R'(x1)>N(1/2)=371/520. Replacing R'(x1) by this value in (15)， we 蹴 that
牢 t^} 
sgn(dIl1/dx1)= sgn(6(1-x)"'+111/260)， which is positive for a11 XE]I/2，I]. • 
The Stackelberg equilibrium locations are then summarized as follows: 
(i) for the uniform distribution， 
1; 1;1. ((1/2， 3/2) 
(x~ ，x~) = ~ 
~~. l (1/2，ー1/2)
and 
率 S，TT * I S (I1 (主)，I2(主))= (8/9，2/9)j 
(i) for the triangular distribution， 
and 
S s， r (1/2， 1.443) 
(xぃx~) = ~ 
~.~' l (1/2，-0.443) 
ヰ S，TT * I.S(I1 (主)，I2(主))= (0.715，0.089). 
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In either case， the firsトmoveradvantage is substantiaL The profiもofthe firm 1 isfour 
times as large制 thatof firm 2 in the uniform case， and approximately eight times in the 
triangular case. The latter exhibits a larger profit differential because of the higher 
concentration of consumers around the center where the first entrant locates. 
s s Furthermore， under the uniform distribution of consumers， we have (x1，xi)=(O，I) 
when the location space is restricted to [0，1]. When this constraint -the justification of 
whlch is iar irom being obvious to usー isrelaxed， we obtain a totally different pattern制
one firm (the leader) locates at the market center and the other (the follower) outside the 
market space. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Our main results can be illustrated by the following two diagrams: 
N 
??? ? ?? 1 呈 2
4 2 
o 0.32 1 
2 
1 1.271.44 
where N stands for the simultaneously chosen locations and S for the sequential ones. 
The following rematks are in order. 
(i) It ，can be shown that Proposition 2 stil holds when the triangular density has 
positive and equal values at the market endpoints， however c10se it is to the uniform 
density. The result also remains valid for convex but log-concave densiti回， such as the 
negative expo附
Proposition 3 in Tabuchl and Thisse (1989)). Thus， moving from the uniform density may 
destroy the existence of a symmetric equilibrium， even though the model remains 
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symmetric. This suggests that the systematic emphasis put on symmetric equilibria in 
standard models of spatial competition is not well founded， and invites us to pay more 
attention to asymmetric equilibria. 
(i) Whenぬ.edensity is∞ncave， symmetric and not "t∞much" different from the 
uniform density，出ereexists a unique Nash location equilibrium， which is symmetric (see 
Proposition 2 in Tabuchi and Thisse (1989)). More precisely， while firms locate at the 
outside quartiles when the density is uniform， they locate c10ser to the market center as the 
density becomes more concentrated. Eventually， they wi1llie inside the market. In such 
cas邸， the price compeもitioneffect is outweighed by the demand effect generated by the 
high concentration of consur附 saround theωnter・Accordingto Neven (1986， Proposition 
3)， the distance to the center from any equi1brium location is greater than 3/8. In view of 
al those results， itappears that the set 01 location eq叫libriais 1Jery sensiti1Je to幼e
spec併cation01 the consumer distribution， thus making the derivation of general r回叫ts
very problematic. 
(ii) As a fina1 remark， letus say that the above analysis has山osh吋 somelight on the 
role of the assumption that firms must locate inside the market space. Indeed， relaxing 
this apparently innocuous assumption may lead to quite different equi1brium 0凶comes.
For example， inthe sequential location game， this yields a completely different locational 
configuration and uncovers a first-mover advantage which does not appear in the standard 
setting. Here also， these results invite us to revisit the models of horizontal product 
differentiation when the location space is unbounded. 
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FOOTNOTES 
A function is said to be log-也oncavewhen the logarithm of this function is concave. 
For example， the positive (negative) exponentials and the power functions are log-eonca 
2 When the strategy space of宣rmlocation is restricted to [0，1]， Proposition 3 is
modified as follows: the equilibrium 10叫 ons are (0， (~-3)/~布石)削
(1-{~-3)/~万五，1) respectively whi1e they are given by伊，加
-0.27 。 0.32 
Zt 
i.o7 
Figure 1 Best reply functions under the triangular consumer distribution 
